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I. Two STAGES OF POLITICAL CHANGE
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the most recent changes in
Japan's political environment that could radically alter its judicial system
and legal profession in the near future. Reform of the judicial system and
legal profession has now been placed on the national agenda, and the cast
of players involved has spread from the traditional groups of legal
professionals (judges, prosecutors, and attorneys) to the major actors of
the larger political process, namely the Liberal Democratic Party (Jiya
Minshu T6) ("LDP"), the ruling conservative party, and the Federation of
Economic Organizations (Keidanren), one of the most influential
organizations representing business interests.
Professor of Law, School of Law, Waseda University; LL.B., LL.M., and
S.J.D., Hokkaido University; M.A., M.Phil., and Ph.D. in sociology, Yale University.
This paper is a revised and updated version of the paper presented at the Center for the
Study of Law and Society at the University of California, Berkeley, on November 5,
1999. An earlier version was presented at the Symposium "Legal Aid and Public Interest
Lawyering in East and Southeast Asian Countries," the Japan Foundation, Tokyo,
December 17-18, 1999. This version is based on the situation in early 2000. Andrew
Beaton, a doctoral candidate in political science at Kobe University Faculty of Law
edited most of the earlier version. This version was edited and revised into law journal
format by Dimitrios Angelis, a J.D. candidate at New York University School of Law,
and, more extensively, by the editorial staff of this journal. The author is most grateful to
all of them.
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To fully appreciate the significance of this recent development, it
is helpful to start with the preceding reform of the National Bar
Examination (shih6 shiken), because it entailed a different kind of political
process in which major players were limited to the three organizations
within the legal profession, namely the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations ("JFBA") (Nihon Bengoshi Reng6kai), the Justice Ministry
(H6mush6), and the Supreme Court (Saik6 Saibansho). This preceding
reform and the recent political change are closely related, but the latter
appears to require a far more sophisticated response from the bar.
II. REFORM OF THE NATIONAL BAR EXAMINATION
The Japanese bar has long been able to maintain an extraordinarily
high entry barrier in terms of the extremely competitive National Bar
Examination.' As late as 1990, only about 500 of the more than 20,000
applicants actually passed the Examination. While the number of
successful applicants has gradually risen since then (812 applicants passed
in the Examination in 1998 with a passing rate of 2.66%), the number of
practicing attorneys is still only 16,369 as of October 29, 1998.2 The
Japanese bar is definitely the smallest among developed countries.
This situation started to change in the late 1980's when the Justice
Ministry proposed increasing the number of those who successfully pass
the National Bar Examination to make it easier for younger applicants to
enter the legal profession. After passing the Examination, candidates
spend two years as judicial trainees (shih6 shfishfisei) at the Legal
Training and Research Institute (Shih6 Kenshhjo) ("Training Institute"),
with salaries paid by the government. Judicial trainees choose one of
three types of occupations within legal profession once they finish the
two-year traineeship. When the Ministry proposed increasing the number
of successful applicants, there was a strong suspicion that the Ministry's
real motivation was to alleviate the problem of recruiting a sufficient
number of judicial trainees to fill prosecutorial positions. Because
prosecutors are career bureaucrats of the Justice Ministry, it is better to
enter the Ministry as early as possible in order to reach higher positions
within the hierarchy of the Ministry. The Ministry may have also wanted
to compete against other government agencies that recruit employees
immediately after they complete their undergraduate education. One way
I For the situation until the early 1980's, see generally Kahei Rokumoto, The
Present State of Japanese Practicing Attorneys: On the Way to Full Professionalization,
in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: CIvIL LAW WORLD 160 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis
eds., 1988).
2 See JFBA Web site, at www.nichibenren.or.jp/english (last visited June 23,
2001).
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to ensure recruitment of young lawyers was to make the Examination
easier to pass before applicants finish their undergraduate legal education
in universities. The Supreme Court concurred. In Japan, the judiciary is
also a career bureaucracy.
3
The JFBA immediately opposed the initiative of the Justice
Ministry, arguing that an increase in the number of those passing would
reduce the quality of lawyers in Japan. However, the Ministry cleverly
presented their initiative in terms of a broader perspective based on the
need to produce lawyers who can cope with the increasing complexity and
internationalization of Japanese society and on the need to expand public
access to lawyers. 4  Thus, in 1987, the Justice Ministry succeeded in
setting the agenda. It formed the Informal Committee on Fundamental
Problems of the Legal Profession (H6s6 Kihon Mondai Kondankai), which
consisted of twelve members: two retired judges, a retired prosecutor, a
former president of the JFBA, a former bureaucrat, two businesspersons,
and five academics. After having obtained a report from the Committee
that generally supported its initiative, the Justice Ministry convened the
Three-Party Committee on the Legal Profession (Hs6 Sansha Ky6gikai)
in 1988, which consisted of representatives from the Justice Ministry, the
Supreme Court, and the JFBA. The Justice Ministry managed to obtain an
agreement in the twenty-second session of the Committee in 1990, and the
National Bar Examination Act was amended in 1991. 5 The number of
those passing the examination increased from approximately 500 to
roughly 600 in 1991, and to 700 in 1993.6
The three groups from within the legal profession also agreed to
certain numerical targets to be achieved in 1995. More than 30% of
applicants passing in 1995 were to be those who have taken the exam
For the status of Japanese judges, see generally Setsuo Miyazawa,
Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC
COMMUNITY 263 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994).
4 For instance, see the statement by the head of the Personnel Department of the
Justice Ministry in HOMU DAIJIN KANBO JINJ1KA [PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF
THE MINISTER, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE], SH1H0 SH1KEN KAIKAKU WO KANGAERU: K1HON
SHIRYOSHU [CONSIDERING THE REFORM OF THE NATIONAL BAR EXAMINATION: A
COLLECTION OF BASIC INFORMATION] 8 (1987).
5 For a collection of various documents and data presented during this process,
see H6mu Daijin Kanb6 Shih6 H6sei Ch6sabu [Department of Research on Judicial and
Legal System, Qffice of the Minister, Ministry of Justice], HOSO YOSEI SE1DO KATKAKU:
SHIH0 SH1KEN WA KO KAWARU [REFORM OF THE TRAINING OF LEGAL PROFESSIONS:
THE NATIONAL BAR EXAMINATION WILL CHANGE THIS WAY] (1991).
6 For the situation of the bar around that time, see generally Shozo Ota & Kahei
Rokumoto, Issues of the Lawyer Population: Japan, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 315
(1993).
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within the last three years, and more than 60% of applicants passing in
1995 would be those who have taken the exam within the last five years.
The other target was to stabilize such trends so that it becomes likely that
more than 40% of applicants passing after 1995 will be those who have
taken the exam within the last three years, and that more than 75% of
passing applicants after 1995 will be those who have taken the exam
within the last five years. A clause was attached in case these numerical
targets were not reached, creating a system that may be called "three years
and you're out." Under this system, 500 applicants will pass based on
their exam scores, but the next 200 will be chosen from among those who
have taken the exam within the past one to three years.
It became apparent in 1994 that these numerical targets would not
be reached in 1995. Since the JFBA opposed the "three years and you're
out" system as discriminatory when it was first proposed, the JFBA
leadership attempted to prevent its implementation by agreeing to a further
increase in the number of passing applicants. They sought to maintain
their negotiating position by agreeing to an increase in the number to
1,000 on the conditions that the number of judges and prosecutors would
also be increased, that the legal aid system would be expanded, and that
free defense counsel would be provided to pretrial detainees. A further
condition and probably most important was the JFBA's insistence that the
existing training system, with its two-year salary, would be maintained.
The Board of the JFBA adopted this proposal on October 12, 1994.
However, the media immediately criticized the proposal as an
attempt to nullify the existing agreement. Moreover, a group quickly
formed within the JFBA that opposed the Board's decision. Their counter
proposal was to maintain the number at 700 and to examine the need to
increase the number only after observing expansion of the judicial system
as a whole. They succeeded in collecting enough proxies to force the
leadership to call a special general meeting on December 21, 1994. This
special meeting resulted in disaster. To prevent an overt split in the JFBA,
the leaders agreed to reduce the number from 1,000 to 800, while
nominally saving their original position by stipulating various conditions
of agreement.
JFBA leaders started negotiations with the Justice Ministry and the
Supreme Court in April 1995. They came close to agreeing upon 1,000 as
the number of passing applicants despite strong opposition within the bar.
The remaining issue was whether the two-year training system with
salaries paid by the government would be maintained. The Supreme Court
and the Justice Ministry apparently did not want to negotiate with the
Finance Ministry to increase the capacity of the Training Institute and the
budget for salaries under the austere budgetary policy of the government.
Instead, the Supreme Court sought to simply shorten the training period in
order to accommodate 1,000 trainees with the same budget and facilities.
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The JFBA refused to shorten the training period. It held another
special general meeting on November 2, 1995, and formally registered its
opposition. As a result, negotiations among the three parties within the
legal profession collapsed. The three-party committee to manage the
National Bar Examination (Shih6 Shiken Kanri Iinkai) met on December
11, 1995. The JFBA was overruled in the discussions, and the "three
years and you're out" system was implemented in the 1996 examination.7
In the 1998 examination, the last passing applicant who took the
Examination within the last three years ranked 1,3 0 0th, while the last
passing applicant from the remaining applicants ranked 6 0 0 th.
In 1991, based on the agreement reached in 1990, the three groups
within the legal profession established the Committee for the System of
Training of the Legal Profession and Related Matters (H6s6 Y6sei Seido
T6 Kaikaku Ky6gikai) ("Reform Committee") to discuss more
fundamental reforms to the Examination and the training of legal
professionals. In addition to four judges, five prosecutors, and six
attorneys, the Reform Committee also included seven law professors, a
journalist, a businessperson, and a president of a national consumer
organization. It was unusual for a three-party committee to include
members from outside the three groups of the legal profession. The JFBA
expected the outside members to support it, but the result was the
opposite. Those outside members strongly criticized the JFBA's
unwillingness to increase the number of successful applicants and rejected
the JFBA's proposals. The outside members interpreted proposals to
increase the number of judges and prosecutors, to expand the legal aid
system, and to provide free legal counsel to pre-indictment criminal
detainees as the JFBA's attempts to prevent increasing the number of
passing applicants.
The Reform Committee issued its opinions in November 1995. It
agreed only on the need to increase the number of passing applicants in
order to increase the number of lawyers. The majority proposed 1,500 as
an intermediate target for increasing the number of successful applicants
as a step toward a larger increase in the number of lawyers. The majority
also recommended a further reduction in the length of practical training by
the Training Institute coupled with a strengthening of continuing
education of already qualified lawyers. The JFBA's proposal to limit the
increase in the number of passing applicants to 1,000 and to introduce
other reforms, including an increase in the number of judges and
7For a story of the development between 1988 and 1997 from the perspective of
an attorney who served on the Three-Party Committee, see generally Shigekazu Iwai,
Shih6 Shiken Hbs6 Ybsei Seido Kaikaku no Keii to Gaiyo [Process and Outline of the
Reform of the National Bar Examination and the Training of Lawyers], 49-1 JIY( TO
SEIGI [LIBERTY AND JUSTICE] 88 (1998).
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prosecutors and a strengthening of the legal aid system, was presented as a
minority opinion. The Committee also required the three groups within
the legal profession to immediately start discussions to realize
fundamental reform of the National Bar Examination and its system of
training lawyers.
8
Following the opinions of the Reform Committee, the Three-Party
Committee of the Legal Profession started work in July 1997 and reached
an agreement in October 1997.9 Because the three parties had already
agreed in the Reform Committee to increase the number of passing
applicants of the National Bar Examination to at least 1,000, the Three-
Party Committee decided to increase the number to 800 in 1998 and to
1,000 in 1999. The length of practical training at the Training Institute
was to be reduced to one and a half years in 1999. The majority, which
consisted of the Justice Ministry and the Supreme Court, presented an
intermediate goal of increasing the number of passing applicants to 1,500
in the future, and the three parties agreed to discuss it in 2002. Eight
hundred twelve applicants actually passed the Examination in 1998.
The length of practical training at the Training Institute has been a
problem as thorny as the number of applicants passing the National Bar
Examination since the two-year joint training period was introduced
during the postwar reform to equalize the social status of practicing
attorneys with that of judges and prosecutors. The proposal by the
Supreme Court and the Justice Ministry was simple: reduce the training
from two years to one and a half years. Knowing that it could not prevent
this reduction, the JFBA leadership proposed providing supplementary
training as attorney trainees (kenshh bengoshi) to those who have finished
the one and a half years in the Training Institute. This proposal was
remarkable, because it was the first attempt by the JFBA to directly take
part in professional training of future lawyers. This concept attracted
favorable commentary from the media. However, the proposal was
opposed not only by the Justice Ministry and the Supreme Court, who did
not want the involvement of the JFBA, but also by many attorneys who
wanted to keep the two-year paid traineeship. The result was a simple
8 See Opinion: H6s6 Y6sei Seido T6 Kaikaku Ky6gkai [Committee on the
System of Training of the Legal Profession and Related Matters], 1084 JURISUTO
[JURIST] 57 (1996), and accompanying articles.
See Shih6 Shiken Seido to H6so Y6sei Seido nikansuru Hoso Sansha G6i
[Agreement by the Three Parties of Legal Profession on the System of National Bar
Examination and Practical Training], 48-12 JYU TO SEIGI [LIBERTY AND JUSTICE] 183
(1997).
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reduction of the training period from two years to one and a half years in
1999. 10
The Justice Ministry dominated the process of the reform until
early 1998. The Justice Ministry and the Supreme Court also managed to
limit the reform to the number of passing applicants and to the length of
practical training. They were able to avoid other issues that required
changes to their respective group, such as increasing the number of judges
and prosecutors and strengthening the legal aid system, even though
scholars and the media often argued that such additional reforms were
necessary.
The JFBA was constantly kept on the defensive. It was unable to
make any positive proposal of its own until it made its counterproposal of
introducing attorney trainees, although this proposal also ultimately failed.
As the JFBA was pressed against the wall, it desperately attempted to find
a way to realign its battle plan and to shape its own future.
Japanese attorneys are a highly regulated profession: advertisement
is virtually prohibited;1 1 they may not have more than one law office; 12 a
fee schedule is published at least as a guideline; they must obtain
permission from the local bar association if they want to join a corporate
legal department;1 3 and they are prohibited from becoming government
employees. 14 Moreover, the small size of the profession has inevitably
produced a highly skewed geographical distribution of attorneys. 15  In
1996, for instance, while Tokyo had 7,336 attorneys for the population of
11,772,000 (one attorney per 1,600 people), 16 Shimane Prefecture had
10 For a discussion of this process from the perspective of the Deputy Secretary
General of the JFBA, see generally Kunio Mizuno, H6s6 Sansha Ky6gikai no Keii to
Sansha G6i no Gaiy6 [Process of the Three-Party Committee of Legal Profession and an
Outline of the Agreement], 49-1 J1Y TO SEIGI [LIBERTY AND JUSTICE] 143 (1998).
11 Code of Ethics for Practicing Attorneys art. 10, at
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/english/latt.htm (adopted on March 2, 1990 at the
Extraordinary General Meeting) [hereinafter Code of Ethics]; also Bengoshi ho
[Practicing Attorneys Law], Law No. 205 of 1949, art. 31 (Japan), at
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/english/regulatil .htm (last amended May 23, 1986).
12 See Practicing Attorneys Law, supra note 11, art. 20.
13 Id. art. 30.
14 Id
15 For an economic analysis of the Japanese bar as a failed cartel, see generally
Mark J. Ramseyer, Lawyers, Foreign Lawyers, and Lawyer-Substitutes: The Market for
Regulation in Japan, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 499 (1986).
16 See YASUO WATANABE ET AL., TEKISUTOBUKKU GENDAI SH1H0 [TEXTBOOK
ON THE CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL SYSTEM] 131 (3d ed. 1997); JAPAN ALMANAC 280
(1998).
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only 22 attorneys for the population of 770,000 (one attorney per 35,000
people). 17 Many attorneys have justified these regulations, the extreme
difficulty of the National Bar Examination, and the very small number of
attorneys by referring to the need for maintaining attorneys' commitment
to human rights and social justice provided in Article 1 of the Practicing
Attorneys Act. 
1 8
Fortunately, however, some signs of internal changes in the bar
indicate an increasing willingness of a growing number of attorneys to
gradually increase their number and to gradually begin to deregulate their
practices. An increasingly larger number of attorneys and even some bar
association committees have started to reexamine these regulations and
problems, and some of them have tried to present a more flexible and
expansive view of lawyering. An early example of this was an ambitious
book edited by Koji Miyakawa and other attorneys.1 9 Miyakawa later
became the chair of the editorial committee of Jiya to Seigi (Liberty and
Justice), the monthly journal of the JFBA. In 1996, he turned it into an
open forum for exchanging different views about the future of attorneys
by publishing a series of articles under the series title of Atarashii Seiki
eno Bengoshi Z6 (Visions of Attorneys for the New Century). The
contributors in this series included several academics, including this
writer, and the articles published in this series were later published as a
book.20  Several bar associations, bar committees, and private groups of
attorneys have also presented their views and visions. One example by a
bar association committee is a book edited by the Tokyo Bar Association's
Special Committee on the Measures for Problems of the Judicial System.
21
An example of participation by a private group of attorneys and scholars is
a book published in November 1998 by such a group, including this
17 Kazuhiro Yonemoto, The Shimane Bar Association: All Twenty-One
Members Strong, 25 LAW IN JAPAN 115, 116 (Daniel H. Foote trans., 1995).
18 See Practicing Attorneys Act, supra note 11, art. 1 (A practicing attorney is
entrusted with a mission to protect fundamental human rights and to realize social
justice).
19 KoJi MIYAKAWA ET AL., 1 & 2 HENKAKU NO NAKA NO BENGOSHI
[ATTORNEYS IN TRANSFORMATION] (1992).
2ONIHON BENGOSHI RENGOKAI HENSHU I1NKAI [EDITORIAL COMMITTEE, JAPAN
FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS], ATARASHII SE1KI ENO BENGOSHI ZO [VISIONS OF
ATTORNEYS FOR THE NEW CENTURY] (1997).
21 TOKYo BENGOSHIKAI SHIHO MONDAI TOKUBETSU IINKAI [SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON THE MEASURES FOR THE PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL SYSTEM, TOKYO BAR
ASSOCIATION], Nijfj-ISSE1KI NO SHTHO [VISIONS OF JUDICIAL SYSTEM TN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY] (1996).
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writer.22 Although there is still strong opposition to any proposal for
increasing their number or reducing their self-regulation and the internal
decision-making process is still extremely slow, JFBA leaders are clearly
moving in that direction.
It is noteworthy that however dramatic the entire process of reform
of the National Bar Examination and practical training might appear to
many attorneys, it has still largely taken place within a fairly closed circle,
mainly consisting of three groups within the legal profession. In contrast,
the most recent development in the last two years radically departs from
this pattern. The LDP and Keidanren have now joined the scene, and the
JFBA must find strategies to cope with these more powerful political
players who can directly influence the legislative process and who can
introduce radical changes through their own initiatives.
III. DEREGULATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY
As background for the LDP's and Keidanren's recent proposals for
a comprehensive judicial reform, a brief examination of the politics of
administrative reform is required.
Administrative reform has been a dominant theme in Japanese
politics since the early 1960's.2 3  It gained momentum under Prime
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-87). At that time, the national debt
was accumulating rapidly, and Nakasone wanted to reduce the costs of
government. Deregulation quickly became the central issue with regard to
administrative reform. An Ad Hoc Advisory Council for the Promotion of
Administrative Reform (Rinji Gy6sei Kaikaku Suishin Shingikai) was
formed in 1987, and another Ad Hoc Council came into existence in 1990.
In the meantime, the Structural Impediments Initiative talks between the
U.S. and Japanese governments began in 1989, and a Policy Action
Reform Proposal, which included more than two hundred items, was
presented to the Japanese government in 1990. This proposal also
included reforms for strengthening the Anti-Monopoly Law, the
strengthening of the consumer protection administration, and many other
reforms the Japanese public had sought for many years. In 1991, the Ad
Hoc Council submitted a report calling for, among other things, the
enactment of an administrative procedure act.
22 SETSUO MYAZAWA & NAOYUKI KUMAGAI EDS., NuuI-ISSEIKI SHTHO ENO
TEIGEN [PROPOSALS FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE TWENTY-FRST CENTURY] (1998).
23 For a concise description of the history of administrative reform until 1991,
see HIROSHI ABE ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF JAPAN 92 (James W. White
trans., 1994).
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In other words, the politics of deregulation did not simply try to
reduce government intervention. It also created a political opportunity to
reexamine many aspects of the postwar political and economic structure,
particularly the role of the administrative bureaucracy. Various legal
reform movements that had been advanced since the end of the war were
finally to realize their long advocated ideas for reform, at least, to a
limited extent. Examples of legal reform include the following:
(1) Amendment of the Commercial Code in 1993 to strengthen
shareholder rights. For instance, a shareholder derivative suit is now
defined as a suit seeking a non-monetary result, because losing board
members pay damages to the company and not to shareholder plaintiffs,
and the filing fee is fixed at 8,200 yen. Although only 31 cases had been
filed between 1950 and 1993, 145 suits were already pending in 1994.24
(2) Implementation of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1994.
Governmental agencies are required to provide reasons when they reject
applications for licenses and permits or make decisions unfavorable to
private parties. Governmental agencies are also prohibited from
conducting administrative guidance (gy6sei shid) 2 5 in areas outside their
jurisdiction or to mistreat a private party that has refused to comply with
administrative guidance.26
(3) Implementation of the Products Liability Act in 1995, which
introduced strict liability.
27
(4) Implementation of the new Code of Civil Procedure on January
1, 1998, which strengthened the judicial power to order parties to produce
documents.
28
(5) Two competing bills of the Freedom of Information Act were
submitted, and a compromise bill was made law in May 1999.
The above examples were all results of political compromise and
were far from what legal reformers had originally envisioned.
Nevertheless, they will at least increase, albeit slightly, the transparency of
24 See Masaru Hayakawa, Shareholders in Japan, in JAPAN: ECONOMIC SUCCESS
AND LEGAL SYSTEM 247-48 (Harald Baum ed., 1996).
25 On administrative guidance, see FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 166-204 (1987); JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT
POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 139-68 (1991).
26 See generally Ken Duck, Comment, Now That The Hog Has Lifted: The
Impact Of Japan's Administrative Procedures Law On The Regulation of Industry And
Market Governance, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1686 (1996).
27 See generally Nancy L. Young, Comment, Japan's New Product Liability
Law: Increased Protection for Consumers, 18 LoY. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 893 (1996).
28 See generally Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1966 Code of Civil Procedure of
Japan: A Procedure for the Coming Century?, 45 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 767 (1997).
The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan: The Rule of Law at Last?
governmental decision-making and opportunities for the public to seek
accountability of government agencies and private corporations.
However, recent proposals by the LDP, Keidanren, and other
organizations go beyond these specific pieces of legislation. They seek to
change the judicial system and legal profession in its entirety. Details of
these proposals are discussed below.
IV. JUDICIAL REFORM AS A NATIONAL AGENDA
The past two years have seen a series of reform proposals on the
judicial system and legal profession presented by major players in
Japanese politics, namely, the government's Administrative Reform
Committee (Gycsei Kaikaku Iinkai), the ruling LDP, and Keidanren.
They have taken the same basic perspective. Because deregulation will
reduce government intervention in many aspects of life, the public should
be given better access to the judicial system and legal profession to ensure
their protection.
The Administrative Reform Committee presented its final opinion
to the Prime Minister on December 12, 1997.2 9  In addition to
deregulation, the report also recommended that public access to
government information be radically expanded, consumer protection
should be strengthened, anti-monopoly laws be more stringently enforced,
and product liability and other appropriate methods be adopted. The logic
behind these proposals is that the legal protection of people must be
expanded if administrative regulation is to be reduced. Based on these
recommendations, the Cabinet adopted a three-year plan to promote
deregulation.
30
Furthermore, governmental committees and even the LDP have
recently published reports on judicial and legal reform, which include a
proposal to strengthen legal aid. For instance, the Research Committee on
Business Law (Kigy6 Hcsei Kenkyakai) of the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (Tsasansh6) ("MITI"), which has long been considered
the champion of business interests, published a report on June 1, 1998,
that urged allowing private legal actions against unfair trade practices and
strengthening the legal aid system. The LDP Special Research Committee
on the Judicial System (Shih6 Seido Tokubetsu Chcsakai) published a
report on June 15, 1998, proposing comprehensive reform of the judicial
29 See Shiry6, Gy6sei Kaikaku Iinkai SaishCt Iken (Sh6) [Final Opinions of the
Administrative Reform Committee: A Summary], 49-2 JwYU TO SEIGi [LIBERTY AND
FREEDOM] 170 (1998).
30 See Kakugi Kettei (Cabinet Decision), Kisei Kanwa Suishin Sankanen
Keikaku (Sh) [Three Year Plan For Promoting Deregulation: A Summary], 49-5 JYU TO
SEIGI [LTBERTY AND FREEDOM] 178 (1998).
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system and legal profession in Japan, including a proposal to strengthen
legal aid. Keidanren also recommended similar reforms in early June
1998. Finally, the MITI Deliberative Committee on Industrial Structure
(Sangy6 K6z6 Shingikai) published a report on July 1, 1998, proposing a
comprehensive reform of the judicial system to ensure business
compliance with the legal rules of a market economy. The strengthening
of legal aid is again included in the recommendations. Among these
recommendations, the most important are, of course, those by the LDP and
Keidanren.
Having received a request from the LDP to present its opinions for
judicial reform, Keidanren adopted its Shih6 Seido Kaikaku ni tsuite no
Iken (Opinions on the Reform of the Judicial System) at its board meeting
on May 22, 1998. This proposal indicated that, as Japan changes from an
economy and society dependent upon the administration to a society with
a free and fair market, companies and individuals will be required to
behave according to the principles of "self-responsibility" (jiko sekinin)
and "transparency" (t6meisei). Therefore, the strengthening of the judicial
system as a fundamental part of the infrastructure of economy and society
is an immediate priority. The proposal also noted that the judicial
infrastructure currently does not possess personnel and institutional
capabilities effective for use by the public and companies. Thus, it
recommended a series of reforms including the following:
(1) The number of judges should be increased.
(2) Non-attorney corporate legal staffs should be allowed to
represent their own companies in litigation and provide legal services to
related companies.
(3) Judges should be appointed from among attorneys.
(4) While legal education has been provided in Japan by
undergraduate non-professional law faculties, graduate professional law
schools should be established.
(5) Diet members, their policy assistants (seisaku hisho), and
corporate legal staffs should be allowed to practice as attorneys without
taking judicial traineeship once they passed the National Bar Examination.
(6) Considering the concentration of attorneys in large cities,
monopoly of legal services by attorneys should be abolished. Therefore,
judicial scriveners (shih6 shoshi), who are presently authorized only to
prepare legal documents, and patent agents (benrishi), who are presently
authorized to represent clients only in the proceedings before the Patent
Agent, should be allowed to handle some routine legal matters.
(7) Multidisciplinary partnerships by attorneys and other law-
related occupations should be allowed.
According to a spokesperson who attended the Judicial System
Symposium of the JFBA on November 6, 1998, these recommendations
were presented as policies that Keidanren will attempt to realize.
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On the other hand, the LDP Special Research Committee on the
Judicial System held a series of sessions beginning on June 12, 1997. It
invited a wide variety of organizations and individuals to present their
views, including Keidanren, the JFBA, and several prominent law
professors. It published its report entitled Nija Isseiki no Shih6 eno
Tashikana Shishin [Firm Guidelines for the Judicial System of the
Twenty-first Century] on June 16, 1998. The report states that transparent
rules and self-responsibility must be realized while maintaining the
traditional national virtue of harmony (wa), and that the judicial system
must be strengthened as a basis for transforming our society into a society
based on the principle of self-responsibility and retrospective supervision
and remedies. It also states that, in such a society, legal specialists should
participate in many aspects of civic life and economic activities, and that
the judicial system should be taking appropriate responses against crime.
It further recommends a series of reforms that included the following:
(1) Strengthening both the quality and quantity of the legal
profession (hs6) and examining the introduction of law schools and the
system of qualifying legal professionals.
(2) Examining the system of recruiting judges from among
practicing attorneys (hs6 ichigen) and examining the system of
continuing education of the legal profession.
(3) Recognizing the importance and urgency of strengthening the
civil legal aid system.
(4) Examining the criminal defense system from a broader
perspective, including the defense of suspects.
31
(5) Examining the possibility of allowing attorneys to open more
than one office and incorporate law firms.
(6) Examining the opening of multidisciplinary partnerships.
(7) Examining public participation in justice (as in introducing a
jury and lay judge).
(8) Widening discussion on the judicial system beyond the three
parties within the legal profession and fulfilling LDP's responsibility to
discuss it in the Diet.
(9) Examining the budget of the courts and the Justice Ministry.
(10) Increasing alternative dispute resolution systems.
(11) Examining the system of judicial review of administrative
agencies.
The LDP's recommendations have a more conservative and "law-
and-order" tone, but the two sets of recommendations widely overlap. A
comprehensive reform of the entire judicial system has suddenly become a
top priority in national politics. In the interest of strengthening the legal
31 The present system does not provide free counsel to suspects before
indictment.
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aid system, it is significant that the LDP Committee clearly recommended
the expansion of civil legal aid.
Furthermore, on December 22, 1998, the Twenty-First Century
Public Policy Institute (Nijh Isseiki Seisaku Kenkyfijo), a think tank
established with funds from Keidanren, published its recommendations,
Toward the Revitalization of Japanese Civil Justice System, which focused
on civil disputes. Although the Institute still recognizes the court as a last
resort for resolving civil disputes, it clearly recommends a shift in focus
from the court to alternative dispute resolutions ("ADR") and proposes
creating a comprehensive ADR system called the Citizen's Court. The
main function of the Citizen's Court would be to provide a forum and
professional legal assistance for autonomous negotiation. Adjudication
might also be provided, if necessary, but that would not be its main
function. Providers of professional legal assistance would not be limited
to attorneys. Retired judges, foreign attorneys, judicial scriveners, patent
agents, administrative scriveners (gy6sei shoshi), non-attorney company
legal staff, retired employees of financial institutions, and even medical
doctors and engineers would be allowed to provide assistance. Eventually,
a comprehensive legal service profession would be formed, and the Justice
Ministry would supervise it for the sake of their consumers. This proposal
is clearly an expanded version of Keidanren's proposal to reduce the
legally-protected monopoly of legal services by attorneys, and the image
of the new legal service profession appears to be strikingly similar to that
of judicial scriveners.
One might wonder what is happening to Japanese legal culture,
which some scholars, particularly conservative ones, view as still
controlling the attitudes and behavior of a majority of Japanese people.
Why do conservatives now want to expand the role of law, the judicial
system, and the Japanese legal profession?
As long as businesses could rely on government agencies to
promote and protect their interests, businesses tried hard to keep the
judicial system and legal profession small and to limit the chances for
ordinary people to use them to protect their interests. Now, under a
prolonged and severe economic recession, the cost of maintaining the
bureaucracy has become prohibitive, and the increasing globalization of
the Japanese economy has made the existing system terribly
uncompetitive. Therefore, reduction of government bureaucracy and the
need to obtain independence from it, in other words, administrative
reform, has become a main concern of businesses. Working together with
the LDP, business groups led by Keidanren have succeeded in producing a
final report on administrative reform. It has already moved to the stage of
implementation.
The next stage appears to be finding an alternative to bureaucracy
to protect business interests. It can be supposed that business groups must
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have learned about the use of law through their international business
activities, particularly those in the United States. In looking at the
Japanese system in a comparative context, they realized how the present
system is small, costly, and inefficient. Keidanren's proposal to allow not
only judicial scriveners and patent agents but also non-attorney corporate
legal staff to represent parties in litigation in particular seemed to signify
its concern with efficiency in handling legal matters. Because business
groups must have also realized that Japanese judges who joined the
judicial bureaucracy immediately after finishing the Training Institute do
not understand contemporary business practices, Keidanren also proposed
that judges be recruited mainly from among experienced practicing
attorneys. To promote this type of reform proposal to the public, however,
business groups and conservatives needed other elements in the package
that would satisfy the needs of ordinary people. Hence, the strengthening
of legal aid, for instance, has been included in the proposal.
Whether this hypothetical explanation is correct or not, it is clear
that business groups and, to a lesser extent, LDP politicians are indicating
that people need more access to the law. It appears that they are trying to
create a new orthodoxy in Japanese society. If so, the so-called Japanese
legal culture should probably be considered as an invention by the elite of
earlier times.32 It is in this context of rapid and broad political change that
the Research Committee on the Legal Aid System (H6ritsu Fujo Seido
Kenkyukai) of the Justice Ministry studied, deliberated, and finally
published its report in March 1998.
3 3
It should be noted here that the bar has lost its noble position as the
sole supporter of legal aid among major organizations in Japan.
Moreover, whereas the bar has no direct access to the legislative process,
the conservative elite does. Whether the actual reform is based on the
proposal from the bar or from these conservatives, an expanded legal aid
system will certainly require a larger number of attorneys to provide legal
services. Unlike earlier times when the bar was the only major group
proposing reform of legal aid without having much chance of realization,
reform of legal aid can actually take place this time. The bar must be
ready to expand or otherwise adjust itself in order to meet the needs of an
expanded legal aid system.
34
32 For this perspective, see generally Frank K. Upham, Weak Legal
Consciousness As Invented Tradition, in MIRROR OF MODERNITY: INVENTED TRADITIONS
OF MODERN JAPAN 48 (Stephen Vlastos ed., 1998).
33 H6ritsu Fujo Seido Kenkyfikai [Research Committee on Legal Aid System],
H6kokusho [Report], 49-5 JIYU TO SEIGI [LIBERTY AND FREEDOM] 193 (1998).
34 For an article written by attorneys on this point, see generally Kazuya Kodera
& Tokiko Kamei, H6ritsu Enjo Ripp6 to Bengoshi Bengoshikai no Aratana Kadai [Legal
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V. THE FINAL REPORT OF THE RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID
AND MORE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING LEGAL AID
The Justice Ministry and the Japan Legal Aid Association formed a
joint study group on legal aid as early as 1988. The JFBA later joined it.
This study group has met fifty times as of June 1994. On the other hand,
the Executive Committee of the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives (Shfgiin), or the lower and more powerful of the two
legislative houses, issued a statement in June 1993 that the Justice
Ministry should engage in systematic research for the further development
of legal aid in Japan. In response, the Justice Ministry formed the
Research Committee on the Legal Aid System in October 1994, including
members from the Supreme Court, the JFBA, the Japan Legal Aid
Association, and academia. The Justice Ministry immediately excluded
criminal legal aid at the pre-indictment stage from the scope of this
committee despite the JFBA's demand to include it. Nevertheless, it is
fair to say that the creation of this committee in itself was the culmination
of efforts by the Legal Aid Association and the JFBA.
The Committee published its final report on March 23, 1998.
Although the report did not go as far as to recognize each individual's
right to legal aid per se, it did assert that legal aid would substantively
guarantee the people's constitutional right to have access to the courts35
and would fit the spirit (shushi) of the people's rights to wholesome and
cultured life,36 respect as individuals, the pursuit of happiness,37 and
equality under the law.38 The report declared that a legal aid system
could be based on both the ideal of the rule of law and the ideal of a
welfare state, so that the state would be responsible for, among other
things, establishing a system by legislation and bearing the financial
burden appropriate for its responsibility. This was the first time in
Aid Legislation and New Tasks For Attorneys and Bar Associations], 48-9 JIYU TO SEIGI
[LIBERTY AND FREEDOM] 52 (1997).
35 KENPO [JAPAN CONST.] art. 32 ("No person shall be denied the right of access
to the courts").
36 Id. art. 25 ("All persons shall have the right to maintain the minimum
standards of wholesome and cultured living").
37Id. art. 13 ("All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with
the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental
affairs").
38 Id. art. 14 ("All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no
discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social
status or family origin").
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Japanese history that a governmental committee recognized the state's
responsibility for providing legal aid to indigent people.
At the same time, the report also recognized the responsibility of
attorneys to actively participate in legal aid in light of their required
commitment to the public interest39 and their monopoly of legal
services.40 The report does not say explicitly either that the bar should
continue to share financial burdens with the state in the future, or that the
bar's financial responsibility will be reduced. Some attorneys have
expressed concern about this ambiguity.41
Following the release of the final report, the Justice Ministry
prepared a bill to reform the civil legal aid system, which became a law in
April 2000. In anticipation of the establishment of a new public interest
corporation (k6eki h6jin), which will be required to be more clearly
separated from the bar, the Legal Aid Association radically changed the
size and composition of its board in April 2000. The number of vice
presidents was reduced from a maximum of eight to two, and the number
of board members was reduced from a maximum of one hundred to
between twenty and twenty-five. The proportion of attorneys was also
reduced, to fifty percent of the board. Thus, as of April 1, 2000, there
were twelve attorneys on the board (including its president, two vice
presidents, and an executive board member) and nine non-attorney board
members. Three non-attorney board members were added soon.
The Justice Ministry submitted a budgetary request to the Finance
Ministry to increase the government contribution to the legal aid system
from 584 million yen (approx. U.S. $5.3 million)42 for fiscal year 1999 to
2.2 billion yen (approx. U.S. $20 million) for fiscal year 2000. Compared
to other developed countries, this figure is still very small. Nevertheless,
this increase should be welcome. The Judicial Reform Council (Shih6
Seido Kaikaku Shingikai) ("JRC"), which was established in late July
1999, decided at its second meeting on September 2, 1999, to present a
proposal to radically expand the national budget for legal aid as an effort
to support the Justice Ministry's initiative. However, the requirement for
recipients to pay into the fund is likely to be maintained in principle.
39See Practicing Attorneys Law, supra note 11, art. 1.
40 Id. art. 72.
41 See Kodera & Kamei, supra note 34, at 55-56.
42 This is calculated at the exchange rate of 110 Japanese yen to one U.S. dollar.
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VI. THE JUDICIAL REFORM COUNCIL
As has already been discussed above, the politics of administrative
reform have developed into the politics of judicial reform. Business
groups led by Keidanren have spearheaded this development. When
Keidanren strongly desires something, the LDP often responds to satisfy
its desires. That is exactly what has happened since Keidanren presented
its proposal for judicial reform in May 1999. In addition to the LDP, a
wide range of groups and individuals have presented their views. The
media has positively responded and quickly formed a general consensus
that the judicial system and legal profession should be more easily
accessible and that the bureaucratic nature of the judiciary should be
changed. Liberal reformers have also joined in the politics, recognizing an
opportunity to introduce fundamental changes in the judiciary for the first
time in Japanese history. Even the JFBA is exploring possibilities to seize
this opportunity to realize its long-standing goals of abolishing the
bureaucratic judiciary and recruiting judges mainly from experienced
attorneys under the slogan of H6s6 Ichigen [Unified Legal Profession].
As if to test the water, the JFBA leadership made a remarkable decision to
invite representatives of Keidanren and the LDP to its Seventeenth
biennial Judicial Symposium on November 6, 1998, which was held to
discuss the very topic of the reform of judicial appointments.
As the culmination of this movement, the late Prime Minister
Keizo Obuchi decided to establish the JRC (Shih6 Seido Kaikaku
Shingikai). Unlike most committees on the judicial system in the past, the
JRC was to be established not under the Justice Ministry, but under the
Cabinet, because the JRC would have to discuss matters presently
managed or controlled by the Justice Ministry. In fact, many reformers,
particularly business people and some scholars, argued that presently
active members of the three groups with the legal profession (h6s6) should
not be included in the committee. That is essentially the same argument
made by reformers who sought administrative reform without the
intervention of bureaucrats who staffed the secretariats formed under
relevant committees.
The law establishing the JRC was enacted by the Diet on June 2,
1999. Article Two of this law, relating to the mandate of the JRC, went
through an interesting process of amendment. The original bill drawn by
bureaucrats simply stated that the JRC shall clarify the role of the judicial
system in Japanese society in the twenty-first century and shall investigate
and deliberate basic policies necessary for the reform of the judicial
system and the improvement of its foundations. This does not specify
what kinds of reforms are expected. After much maneuvering by
politicians and bureaucrats, the Diet inserted a clause that clarified the
general direction of the expected reform. This clause specifies that the
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reform should include policies to make the judicial system more accessible
to the public, to allow public participation in the judicial system, and to
enrich and strengthen the legal profession. Both houses of the Diet also
attached special resolutions to the law.
The House of Representatives (Shagiin), the more powerful lower
house, said that the JRC shall discuss such important matters as unification
of legal profession,43 enhancement of both the quantity and quality of the
legal profession, public participation in the judicial system, and the
relationship between human rights and criminal justice. The House of
Councilors (Sangiin), the less powerful upper house, said that the JRC
shall pay particular attention to the protection of fundamental human
rights, to the realization of the constitutional ideal of the rule of law, and
particularly to the perspective of the public as users of the judicial system.
As a piece of legislation in Japan, this is nothing other than remarkable.
The JRC is mandated to present its final report to the Prime Minister in
two years.
Thus, the selection of thirteen members of the JRC became a
critical issue. Eventually, the following were selected: three law
professors, three senior members of the legal profession (each representing
one of the three groups in the legal profession), two business people (each
representing Keidanren and the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce), the
President of the Federation of Private Universities,44 a female professor in
accounting, and a female writer,45 and one representative each from a
labor organization (Reng6) and a consumer organization (the Federation of
Housewives or Shufuren).
The three law professors are: K6ji Sat6 of Kyoto University, a
constitutional scholar, Morio Takeshita, a civil procedure scholar who was
formerly at Hitotsubashi University and is presently the President of
Surugadai University, and Masahito Inoue, a criminal procedure scholar at
the University of Tokyo who is widely known for his works that provided
the theoretical underpinning for the recent legislation to legalize
wiretapping for criminal investigations. Among these scholars, Sat6 was
heavily involved in administrative reform and known for his work in
helping to consolidate central governmental agencies against resistance by
bureaucrats. Sat6 argued that the rule of law failed to materialize in Japan,
that administrative reform was the first step to the realization of that ideal,
and that judicial reform would complete the transformation of Japanese
43 Namely, abolishing career judicial officers and appointing experienced
attorneys as judges.
44This was the President of Keio University.
45 The female writer was Ayako Sono, the President of the Japan Foundation,
which was formerly known as the Sasagawa Foundation.
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society so that autonomous individuals would be able to design their own
46society through their participation in legislative and judicial processes.
Sat6 was also known for his proposal to introduce graduate professional
law schools as the best way to assure the quality of lawyers, whose
number will inevitably increase in order to improve public access to
justice. It was widely believed that the Prime Minister appointed Sat6 to
chair the JRC. The other two law professors, Takeshita and Inoue, were
not known for their views on judicial reform and were widely expected to
take traditional views.
Perhaps the best known person of the three senior members from
the legal profession is K6hei Nakab6, an Osaka attorney and former JFBA
President. When the bubble economy collapsed and banks were unable to
recover their losses from loans to housing loan companies (jasen), the
government bailed out those banks by giving them tax money of 685
billion yen (approx. US $5.7 billion).47 In return, the government acquired
those bad debts and established a special corporation in July 1997 to
recover as much money as possible from those debtors who were able to
pay. Because those debtors include organized crime and exposing hidden
assets of those debtors would be extremely difficult, a person with
enormous courage and integrity was needed to head the special
corporation. The government asked Nakab6 to take the job and he agreed.
In the two years and seven months since its establishment, this
corporation, the Housing Loan Bad Debts Management System, Inc.
(Kabushiki-Gaisha Jfitaku Kinya Saiken Kanri Kik6 or Jakan), succeeded
in recovering an astonishing 1.55 trillion yen (approx. U.S. $12.9
billion).48  Nakab6 assembled a group of attorneys and used all
conceivable legal instruments.49  He sued former executives of those
housing loan companies for their individual responsibilities in the failure
of their companies. He even sued Sumitomo Bank for its role in
misleading a housing loan company into lending money to a losing
project, while requiring the loan company to open and keep an account in
return for its services of introducing customers. Nakab6 openly criticized
the judicial system for its failure in handling these and other financial
issues. He became an undeniable national hero. Although many people
46 See, e.g., K6ji Sat6, Jiyit no H6 Chitsujo [Legal Order for Liberty], in 2
KENPO GOJONEN NO TENB0 [2 THE PROSPECT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AT ITS
FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY] 1, 54-58 (K6ji Sat6 et al. eds., 1999).
47 Based on an exchange rate of 120 Japanese yen to one U.S. dollar.
48 Based on an exchange rate of 120 Japanese yen to one U.S. dollar.
49 See, e.g., KOHEI NAKABO, JUKAN KINQ SAIKEN KAISHU NO TATAKA [THE
BATTLE OF BAD DEBTS COLLECTION BY THE HOUSING LOAN BAD DEBTS MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM, INC.] (1999).
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who do not want to introduce real reforms opposed his inclusion in the
JRC, the government apparently had no other choice than to select him as
a representative of attorneys. At the age of seventy, he left the company
and declared that he would work on judicial reform full-time and that he
would not take a narrow perspective of representing only the interests of
the bar. Instead, he would take a much broader perspective and reflect the
concerns of ordinary users.
The two other senior lawyers are a former head of a high court and
a former head of a high prosecutor's office. Their views on judicial
reform were unknown, but they were widely expected to take more
traditional views. Two academics from outside the legal field were also
unknown for their views.
The four members representing users of the judicial system,
namely business, labor, and consumers, were also relative unknowns.
Although each group had prominent and eloquent representatives widely
known for their views, those people were not appointed. The last person,
Ayako Sono, is a writer who is an ubiquitous figure in government
committees and is known for her realistic views on human nature, her
barbed comments, and her criticism of the JFBA.
In this group of 13 members, only Sat6 and Nakab6 are clear
reformers, but styles differ widely as can be expected from their respective
backgrounds. Other members are more or less unknown. If Sat6 and
Nakab6 manage to form an alliance and sway a majority of members, the
JRC could actually deliver a comprehensive reform package as expected
by the special resolutions of the Diet. If they fail, the present system,
which has virtually remained unchanged since the Meiji era, will continue
in Japan in the twenty-first century.
One should also note that, although the JRC was established under
the Cabinet, the Justice Ministry managed to control its secretariat. As of
July 27, 1999, the secretariat had sixteen members. Its head, the Secretary
General, is a prosecutor from the Justice Ministry. The Justice Ministry
has six more members in the secretariat, including a former lower court
judge who has been transferred to the Ministry. The Supreme Court sent
another lower court judge, while the JFBA sent two attorneys. The
remaining members include three from the Finance Ministry (Okurash6),
and one each from the Education Ministry (Monbush6), the MITI, and the
Construction Ministry (Kensetsush6). No academics are included.
Because the JRC members work on a part-time basis, these members of
the secretariat are the only people who will be working full-time on
judicial reform. The secretariat prepares a list of issues to be discussed
and presents materials and drafts to the JRC. As is always the case on
government committees, the relationship between the JRC and the
secretariat is another key element in determining the outcome of the JRC's
efforts.
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The JRC held its first meeting on July 27, 1999. The first issue
was the selection of the chairman. The Secretary General immediately
proposed to select the chairman, but Nakab6 argued that it was
nonsensical to do so without knowing each member's views. Thus, every
member was virtually forced to express some commitment to reform,
although several members expressed reservations against wholesale
reform, stating that they should carefully examine whether proposed
reforms suit the Japanese. After that, Nakab6 nominated Sat6 to serve as
the chairperson, denying the secretariat the opportunity to formally
nominate Sat6. The next issue was the extent to which deliberations
should be open to the public. The JRC quickly agreed to publish minutes
in both printed form and through the Internet, 50 but they could not reach an
agreement on whether they should allow observers. There was a
confrontational exchange between Nakab6, who favored opening
deliberations to the public, and Sono, who opposed it. Sono also
published her objections in newspapers. When the JRC held its second
meeting on September 2, 1999, representatives of the three groups within
the legal profession were allowed to observe deliberations, but the media
was still excluded. The lack of media coverage could seriously hinder the
public's ability to present their views in a timely fashion, but the media
was finally allowed to observe deliberation through a closed circuit TV.
In any event, there is no guarantee that the JRC will actually
present a comprehensive reform proposal. Therefore, to ensure reform, it
is important that the public constantly remind its members of why the JRC
was formed. It is also important that the public obtain information
regarding the activities of the Council. For this purpose, a group of
scholars, including this writer, started a monthly journal, Gekkan Shih6
Kaikaku [Journal of Judicial Reform in Japan], on October 5, 1999.
VII. MOVEMENT TO INTRODUCE GRADUATE PROFESSIONAL LAW
SCHOOLS
The public should be extremely alert to the developments in the
JRC, because there appears to be a concerted effort to influence the JRC in
order to maintain the status quo. An event concerning the introduction of
graduate professional law schools is instructive.
In Japan, law has been taught at undergraduate non-professional
law schools. 51 No other academic institutions provide comprehensive
50 Minutes are available at the Council's Web site,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido.
51 See Yasuhei Taniguchi, Legal Education in Japan, in LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 295, 298-302 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994).
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academic legal education. However, a law degree is not required to sit the
National Bar Examination. On the other hand, the Training Institute
provides only practical training to those who have passed the National Bar
Examination. In other words, there is no academic legal education that is
directly connected to the training of future lawyers. Therefore, several
legal academics, including myself, proposed to introduce graduate
professional law schools in Japan.52 The idea of graduate professional law
schools did not receive serious attention, however, because the discussion
was limited to the closed circle of the legal profession and law professors.
In 1999, however, the establishment of graduate professional law
schools suddenly became a major policy issue, both as part of a set of
proposals for judicial reform and as an effort to reform university
education in general. Among advocates of judicial reform, Sat6,
Chairperson of the JRC, is a leading proponent of graduate professional
law schools. Both Keidanren and the LDP mentioned the idea in their
proposals. Among advocates of university reform, the Deliberative
Council on Universities (Daigaku Shingikai) of the Education Ministry
presented its recommendations on October 26, 1998, and recommended
that the Ministry examine the possibility of graduate law schools as part of
its larger recommendation to strengthen graduate programs in Japanese
universities.
Under the present system, even completion of a four-year
undergraduate legal education is not a prerequisite for the National Bar
Examination. Passing the examination with only six subjects
(constitutional law, civil law, commercial law, criminal law, civil
procedure, and criminal procedure) is the only requirement for admission
to the Training Institute. Given the extreme competitiveness of the
National Bar Examination, most applicants simply go to private cram
schools immediately after entering college and, in some cases, even before
entering college. Most of those who pass the examination in such a
manner lack any significant intellectual background outside law or
meaningful social experience. Even their legal background is limited and
shallow, because they have learned only the patterns of questions and
answers in the limited range of subjects included in the Examination.
Their legal knowledge lacks a foundation in broader, comprehensive, and,
most importantly, critical and reflective examinations of the law, the
judicial system, and the legal profession.
After passing the examination, they will receive practical training
as judicial trainees for eighteen months. Only six months in total-
52 For an eloquent argument by an eminent Anglo-American law professor that
Japan has no professional legal education, and that the Training Institute cannot be seen
as a professional law school, see generally HIDEO TANAKA, HABADO RO SUKfKU
[HARVARD LAW SCHOOL] 252-55 (1982).
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divided into the two three-month periods at the beginning and the end of
the traineeship-are spent in classrooms at the Training Institute. These
six months are too short to compensate for what most trainees have failed
to acquire before coming there, namely broader non-legal intellectual or
social backgrounds and broader, comprehensive, and critical examination
of the law, the judicial system, and the legal profession. Moreover,
principal teachers at the Training Institute are carefully selected
mainstream judges who teach only orthodox legal doctrines and practice
skills acceptable to them.
I believe that the combination of this system of practical training,
appointment of assistant judges immediately after training, and
administrative control over judges throughout their careers are the main
institutional bases of the extreme form of legal positivism and passivity of
most judges in Japan. I have argued for several years that the present
system of practical training under the Training Institute should be replaced
with a decentralized method of professional legal education in universities,
where faculty members, who enjoy both academic freedom and
independence from the judiciary, present a wide range of different views
to future lawyers.53
Currently, trainees will spend one year during the middle of their
eighteen months of traineeship as apprentices in local courts, prosecutors'
offices, and law firms. Although most of these trainees will eventually
become practicing attorneys, they will spend only three months in law
offices. I believe that such brief and shallow apprenticeships can never
guarantee the quality of lawyers to the public. The present system of
professional legal education is totally deficient in this sense.
54
As part of the broader reform of university education in Japan, the
Education Ministry formed the Conference of Cooperating Scholars in the
Research on the Method of Legal Education (H6gaku Ky6iku no Arikata
ni Kansuru Ch6sa Kenkyh Ky6yokusha Kaigi), consisting of fifteen law
professors from thirteen law faculties, including seven national and six
private law faculties. Kyoto University and Osaka University law
faculties held symposia on this issue on July 3 and 5, 1999, respectively,
and the University of Tokyo and Kobe University law faculties held their
53 For my view on the reform of judicial system and legal profession, SETSUO
MIYAZAWA & NAOYUKI KUMAGAI EDS., NuI-ISSEnKI SHTHO NO TEIGEN [PROPOSALS FOR
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY] 2-32 (1998).
54 See Setsuo Miyazawa, H6ka Daigakuin Jitsugen ni Kitai [Hoping the
Realization of Graduate Profession Law Schools in Japan], YOMIURI SHIMBUN (morning
ed.), Aug. 10, 1999, at 11. See also Setsuo Miyazawa, H6ka Daigakuin Rongi No
Kasseika To T6meika No Tameni [For More Active And Transparent Discussion on
Graduate Professional Law Schools], 1 GEKKAN SHTHO KA1KAKU [MONTHLY JOURNAL
OF JUDICIAL REFORM IN JAPAN] 9-13 (1999).
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symposia on September 20 and 26, 1999, respectively. Okayama and
Hitotsubashi law faculties soon followed.
Because it is unrealistic to allow all of the more than ninety law
faculties that admit nearly 50,000 students each year to establish graduate
professional law schools and because undergraduate legal education is so
well entrenched in the Japanese educational system, radical proposals such
as the one I presented are not likely to be adopted. I had proposed the
following:
1) Because most undergraduate law faculties teach both law and
political science, law programs should be turned into liberal arts programs
combining political science and social scientific studies of law and
reducing technical and doctrinal courses. This would be comparable to the
Legal Studies Program at the University of California at Berkeley.
2) Three-year graduate professional law schools should be
established to provide professional legal education as a prerequisite to the
National Bar Examination, and their clinical programs should be used as
resources for legal aid.
3) Graduate professional law schools should admit students from a
broad range of undergraduate educational backgrounds as well as a sizable
number of mature students.
4) The Training Institute should be abolished and practical training
should be provided by the bar itself, as in the Canadian model.55
Less radical proposals have led the debate so far. For instance,
Shigeaki Tanaka of Kyoto University Faculty of Law has presented the
56
most influential model. He proposed that the senior (fourth) year in
undergraduate law faculties be combined with a two-year graduate
program to create a three-year professional law school model. He also
proposed that these three-year professional law schools provide education
not only for those intending to become lawyers in a narrow sense (judges,
55 For more elaborate proposals following the United States model, see
generally Yukio Yanagida, Nihon No Atarashii H6s6 Y6sei (1)(2) [A New System of The
Training of the Legal Profession in Japan], JURISUTO [JURIST], Feb. 1, 1998, at 111 (Part
I), and JURISTO [JURIST], Feb. 15, 1998, at 65 (part II); and Yukio Yanagida, R6-Sukriru
H6shiki No K6s6 Ni Tsuite [On the Proposal of a System of Greaduate Professional
Legal Education], JURISUTO [JURIST], July 15, 1999, at 72. For an additional proposal to
abolish the Training Institute and provide practical training by the bar, see generally
Naoya End6, Jitsumu KenkyCt Ky6iku No T6g6 Wo Mezasu H6ka Daigakuin K6s6 [A
Proposal on Graduate Professional Law Schools that Combines Practice, Research, and
Education, 50-5 J"Y TO SEIGI [LIBERTY AND JUSTICE] 24 (1999).
56 See Shigeaki Tanaka, H6s6 Y6sei Seido Kaikaku To Daigaku No H6gaku
Ky6iku [Reform Of The Legal System Of Training Of The Legal Profession And
University Legal Education], in 1 KYOTOo DAIGAKU HOGAKUBU HYAKUSHONEN KINEN
RONBUNSHU [PAPERS COMMENMORATING THE CENTENARY OF KYOTO UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF LAW] 53 (Ky6to Daigaku H6gakubu ed.,1999).
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prosecutors, and attorneys) but also for those planning to take the Civil
Service Examination or to join corporate legal departments without taking
the National Bar Examination. Tanaka further proposed that the Training
Institute should provide at least one year of practical training for a few
years after the introduction of graduate professional law schools in Japan,
although this would eventually be multiplied or abolished if the number of
law students increased.
The University of Tokyo law faculty presented a slightly modified
version of Tanaka's proposal; it proposed a special course in the third and
fourth year of undergraduate law curricula for those interested in
professional legal careers and to require completion of those courses as
prerequisites for entrance into two-year professional law schools. The
Kobe University law faculty presented a more liberal and idealistic model;
it proposed a three-year graduate program that would admit graduates of
both law and non-law undergraduate faculties, with a condition that non-
law graduates take a one-year conversion program before actually
beginning a graduate professional program.
The initial number of students in an entering class at graduate
professional law school varies from 2,000 to 4,000. All proposals assume
that the National Bar Examination will become a purely qualifying
examination without a pre-determined quota, and that 70% to 80% of law
school graduates will pass.
I am not satisfied with the present trend in reform that is led by
more moderate proposals. If the final plan is more moderate than the
currently proposed moderate plans, it will effectively result in maintaining
the present system of undergraduate law faculties and the Training
Institute.
Nevertheless, even under such a moderate scheme, the introduction
of graduate legal education that is consciously designed to educate future
lawyers in an academic environment will be a revolutionary development
in terms of the history of legal education in Japan. Graduate professional
law schools in Japan will certainly provide broader, deeper, and more
critical education than "cram" schools and will dilute the influence of the
Training Institute, which now monopolizes professional legal education.
However, strong opposition is anticipated from the Supreme Court,
many members of the bar, and many law professors. The Supreme
Court's opposition is easy to understand. It will lose its monopoly on
professional legal education if graduate professional law schools are
established. Moreover, it will lose control over judicial ideology if
universities become the primary institutions for theoretical legal education
for those people who clearly intend to become lawyers.
Inside the Bar, the Second Tokyo Bar Association, one of the three
bar associations in Tokyo, presented its own proposal on October 12,
1999. It proposed establishing two-year graduate professional law schools
The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan: The Rule of Law at Last?
that admitted graduates of both law and non-law undergraduate faculties.
It also proposed to abolish the Training Institute and to replace it with the
system of two-year practical training as trainee attorneys (kensha
bengoshi) under authorized supervising attorneys, a system similar to that
existing in the Canadian province of Ontario.
Many members of the bar, however, oppose the idea because they
view the present training at the Training Institute as a symbol of the
postwar movement to equalize the social status of attorneys with that of
judges and prosecutors. Arguably, the other side of that achievement is
that the training of future attorneys was also firmly placed in the hands of
mainstream judicial bureaucrats, and the programs designed for training
attorneys have always been a minor part of the present system.
Furthermore, the Justice Ministry and the Supreme Court have already
shortened the traineeship from two years to one and a half years.
Nevertheless, many attorneys want to maintain the present system of
practical training at the Training Institute.
Opposing attorneys also mention several other reasons to halt
reform. The present National Bar Examination, which does not even
require applicants to have undergraduate legal education, is probably the
most open examination to qualify lawyers in the world. Requiring
applicants to finish graduate professional law schools before taking the
Examination will destroy its present character. Because students will have
to pay tuition for two or three more years to study at graduate professional
law schools after already having paid tuition for four years at
undergraduate law faculties, only the wealthiest people will be able to
become lawyers. Only a limited number of universities will be accredited
to establish graduate professional lawyers, and a clear hierarchy will be
created among universities. Further, once established, graduate
professional law schools will inevitably increase the number of attorneys.
Opponents of legal education reform do not mention, however, that
only three percent of applicants currently pass the examination, which is
supposedly both open and equal, and that most of the applicants spend
much time and money in cram schools and attempt to pass the
examination several times before ultimately failing. They do not mention
that even those few who eventually pass the examination have done little
other than cram for the examination, without enriching themselves either
through broader study or social experience.
Finally, many law professors also oppose the idea of establishing
graduate professional law schools. One obvious reason is the one
mentioned above: a clear hierarchy will appear between universities with
graduate professional law schools and those without them. Various other
reasons are also mentioned. The Education Ministry will control
accreditation and impose its policies on curriculum. Doctrinal scholars
will expand their control over legal education, and, under their legal
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positivism, theoretical, interdisciplinary, and comparative scholars will be
excluded from graduate professional law schools. A large number of
practitioners will be hired as full-time faculty members, and they will
undermine the quality of legal scholarship in Japan. Graduate professional
law schools cannot train scholars, and, because Japanese private
universities heavily rely on student tuition, most of them cannot afford to
open more resource-intensive graduate professional law schools. Private
graduate law schools will be clearly placed under national universities in
terms of their social prestige. Most American law schools are trade
schools without much interest in professional ethics, and graduate
professional law schools in Japan will become more like them. Finally,
undergraduate legal education should not be abolished because it has
played a significant role in Japanese society by educating government
officials and business executives and by producing a large number of
legally-trained citizens. Again, all of these reasons are usually combined
and cited together.
What these opponents fail to mention is that university legal
education has largely become irrelevant both for those who want to
become lawyers and for those who do not. On the one hand, those who
want to become lawyers simply go to cram schools immediately after
entering, or even before entering, undergraduate law faculties. Passing the
Examination is everything; what they achieve in schools or in society is
irrelevant. Although law faculties are constantly introducing new courses
or otherwise revising their curricula, those students do not pay much
attention to courses other than those included in the National Bar
Examination. That is why admission officers of American law schools are
often surprised by low grade point averages of Japanese attorneys who
have applied to their LL.M. courses.
While teaching at an American law school a few years ago, I was
visited by a group of Japanese law students who had just passed the
National Bar Examination. Because they had passed the Examination
before finishing their undergraduate legal education, they visited some
American law schools to use their time before graduation for good
purposes. I asked them which professors they liked most. They could not
answer; they had spent most of their time in cram schools. Some of them
asked me to recommend English-language books on Japanese law. I told
them that their universities have excellent libraries, but they did not know
how to find books. Such was the caliber of people, some of whom had
been praised by the media as the brightest stars to lead Japan into the
twenty-first century.
On the other hand, those students who came to law faculties
without having a clear idea about their future, except the idea that law
would give them a wider range of options than other fields, are simply
forced to take a large number of highly technical or sophisticated courses
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even though they are not really interested in them or able to understand
them. For the most part, they are quite relieved when they graduate,
because they no longer need to study law.
Those professors who oppose the idea of graduate professional law
schools do not mention these problems. They naturally consider moderate
proposals more favorably5 7 but still want to prevent the introduction of
graduate professional law schools.
Although law professors have failed to take any measures to
remedy these problems, cram schools have rapidly extended their
tentacles, and some have recently infiltrated university campuses. A few
law faculties have actually invited the cram schools to hold courses on
their campuses in order to increase the number of their students who pass
the Examination. Some universities even give credit for such courses. I
criticized this trend as a death knell blow to university legal education in
the first issue of the new monthly, Journal of Judicial Reform in Japan
(Gekkan Shih6 Kaikaku), without naming the law faculties. In the same
issue, a cram school placed an ad, proudly disclosed those law faculties,
and encouraged other law faculties to join its network in anticipation of
the introduction of graduate professional law schools.
Therefore, there is a clear possibility that the Supreme Court,
attorneys, and law professors will form a curious alliance in their
opposition to graduate professional law schools, with cram schools being
their largest beneficiaries. The situation appears to be analogous to what
happened in Korea when a similar proposal was killed in 1995.
Of course, much more discussion is required before a final plan for
graduate professional education is adopted. For instance, I proposed that
accreditation of law schools should not be done by the fiat of the
Education Ministry. An independent accreditation body, including
representatives of the legal profession and academia, should be
established; every law school should be required to admit a certain number
of mature students and should limit the number of admissions from
undergraduate programs in the same university, and theoretical, empirical,
comparative, and critical approaches should be fully integrated into
professional law schools. Moreover, the secrecy of the Conference of
Cooperating Scholars in the Research on the Method of Legal Education
organized by the Education Ministry has raised speculation that only those
universities included in the Conference will obtain professional graduate
law schools. I proposed that the Ministry and the JRC should establish a
formal committee to openly discuss the issue. These measures actually
meet many of the concerns raised by opponents, who still, however, refuse
57 See, for instance, how Shigeaki Tanaka's proposal is treated by a leading
opponent, Michiatsu Kaino, Shih6 Kaikaku to R6 SukiTru Ks6 [Judicial Reform and Law
Schools], 71-8 HORITSU JTHO [CURRENT LAW JOURNAL] 1,3 (1999).
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to actively participate in the debate. This situation is most unfortunate,
because the total failure to establish graduate professional law schools will
mostly benefit cram schools and judicial bureaucrats.
Then, a seemingly small but interesting event was revealed in
August. Takashi Aoyama, a member of the House of Representatives, on
August 3, 1999, sent a set of questions to the Prime Minister regarding
methods to increase the number of lawyers in Japan. He asked whether
Japan needs at least 50,000 attorneys, whether Japan needs to increase the
number of attorneys who are able to work in international settings, and
whether American-style law schools should be introduced as an effective
method to increase lawyers. The Prime Minister replied to Aoyama on
August 31, 1999. To the first two questions, he said that he would take
proper measures following deliberation in the JRC. However, on the third
question, he clearly took a negative position, indicating that American-
style law schools are unacceptable in Japan. The Prime Minister never
mentioned the JRC. Is the Prime Minister not undermining the authority
of the JRC he himself had established?
Of course, the notion that the Prime Minister wrote such a reply
entirely by himself is unrealistic. A bureaucrat must have drafted it. The
reply was approved at a cabinet meeting, however, which could mean that
neither the Prime Minister nor the Education Minister objected to it or, at
least, that they failed to recognize the significance of this reply.
This is just one minor event. It nonetheless vividly reminds
us how fragile the foundation of the JRC might be.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Historically, the Japanese legal system has largely been an
instrument of the government to govern citizens. The legal system has
rarely played a significant role as an instrument for citizens to challenge
the government or big business or to solve disputes among them. Hence,
K6ji Sat6, Chairperson of the Judicial Reform Council, recently wrote that
Japan, even after World War II, has had "rule by law," not the "rule of
law.''58 A combination of factors has suddenly made business groups and
conservative politicians interested in judicial reforms that can potentially
facilitate the rule of law in Japan. Japan is clearly in the midst of a rare
opportunity to introduce some tangible reforms to promote the rule of law.
It is also possible, however, that the LDP and Keidanren will stop
their drive once they have satisfied their immediate goals, without
attempting further reforms that will improve ordinary people's access to
justice. The only group in Japan that claims to be the champion of
58 See supra note 46.
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ordinary people is the bar. The bar, however, has been extremely reluctant
to reform itself regarding a vital issue, namely increasing the number of
lawyers. The bar will largely be excluded from the politics of judicial
reform, unless it quickly, radically, and publicly changes its position on
this issue. In the meantime, the groups that control the present system,
namely the Supreme Court and the Justice Ministry, are working hard to
influence the JRC. They virtually control the JRC's secretariat. A sizable
number of attorneys and law professors also want to maintain the present
legal education. This will inevitably result in serving the interests of the
Supreme Court and the Justice Ministry as well as those of cram schools.
Much will depend on the battle within and around the JRC. An
important development occurred when the JRC met on November 9, 1999.
Each member except Sat6 and Sono, the novelist, individually presented a
list of issues to be discussed in the JRC. There was, reportedly, a wide
consensus on the need to discuss possibilities of changing the system of
judicial appointments. Presently, judges are recruited immediately after
they have completed the Training Institute. The proposed system would
recruit more experienced candidates and a wider variety of lawyers. Also
considered are jury trials or lay judges, a radical increase in the number of
lawyers, and a radical expansion of the legal aid system. There has even
been a suggestion that legal aid be provided to the criminally accused at
the pre-indictment stage. This is a promising sign.
The JRC formally published its self-selected agenda on December
21, 1999.59 Reformers should quickly, publicly, and loudly express their
views to prevent back-pedaling by the JRC. That is what I have been
doing, particularly through writing in Gekkan Shih6 Kaikaku [Journal of
Judicial Reform in Japan].
Postscript
60
The Judicial Reform Council presented its final report (Ikensho)
to Prime Minister Jun'ichi Koizumi on June 12, 2001. Among
innumerable recommendations, the JRC proposed the following:
1. In the area of civil justice, (1) reducing the average length of
litigation by half; (2) allowing the winning party to recover part of
attorney's fees from the losing party under certain conditions; and (3)
strengthening civil legal aid.
59 Ronten Seiri [Points at Issue in the Judicial Reform], at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/0620reform.html (last visited June 27, 2001)
(available in English).
60 This postscript was written on June 22, 2001.
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2. In the area of criminal justice, (1) providing a free defense
counsel from the investigation stage, in contrast to the present system,
which provides a free defense counsel only after indictment; and (2)
making certain decisions by the Prosecution Review Board (Kensatsu
Shinsakai) binding, in contrast to the present system where its decisions
are only advisory.
3. In the area of legal education and the production of legal
professionals, (1) establishing graduate professional law schools (h6ka
daigakuin) in 2004, with both standard programs requiring three years and
shortened programs requiring only two years for those who have already
acquired a high level of legal knowledge; (2) introducing a new National
Bar Examination, and increasing the number of those passing to 3,000
people per year by 2010, in contrast to only approximately 990 in 2000;
and (3) increasing the total population of active legal professionals
(judges, prosecutors, and attorneys) to approximately 50,000 by 2018.
4. In the area of reforms of legal professionals, (1) abolishing or
loosening several regulations over attorneys and provision of legal
services, including permitting judicial scriveners (shih6 shoshi) to
represent parties in summary courts (kan'i saibansho); and (2) requiring,
in principle, every assistant judge (hanjiho) to obtain practical experience
outside the court, appointing more judges from among attorneys,
establishing an advisory organization on the appointment of lower court
judges by the Supreme Court, and basing the internal evaluation of judges
on clearer standards and more transparent procedures.
5. In the area of public participation in the administration of
justice, introducing, in certain serious criminal cases, lay assessors
(saiban'in) who will be randomly selected on a case-by-case basis to
decide both fact and law with professional judges, and allowing an appeal
from their decision.
Among these and other reforms, reform of legal education and
the production of lawyers are priorities, because the JRC considers the
production of a far larger number of better-educated legal professionals as
the basis for the entire reform. Therefore, the JRC urged the concerned
agencies (kankei kikan) to set standards for recognizing law schools and
allowing graduates to sit in the National Bar Examination as soon as
possible.
However, there are various problems in details.
First, undergraduate law faculties will remain in some revised
forms. Therefore, universities with an undergraduate law faculty will be
tempted to create a graduate law school mainly with a two-year program
and fill it with its own undergraduate law students, unless the JRC sets
some clear guidelines to prevent it.
The JRC proposed to introduce an LSAT-style aptitude test for
admission, but it also mentioned the possibility of introducing a
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preliminary examination on legal knowledge for students who apply to a
two-year program. If such an examination is introduced in the form of a
single national examination, undergraduate law students will simply go to
cram schools to prepare for it without learning much in universities, as
they do presently for the National Bar Examination.
Although graduation from a law school will be the main
qualification to be able to sit in the National Bar Examination, the JRC
also mentioned the need to create a "bypass," where those who cannot
afford to go to a law school and those who have already acquired practical
legal experience will be allowed to take the Exam without satisfying the
law school requirement. Is it possible to introduce such a bypass without
creating general disincentive to go to graduate law school? How should
we screen people who will be allowed to sit in the National Bar
Examination without going to a law school? If the JRC introduced a
preliminary examination of legal knowledge, people would again simply
go to cram schools.
Finally, although the JRC proposed to create new law schools as
"professional schools," it also proposed that practical apprenticeship
(jitsumu shfisha) be maintained. If the Legal Research and Training
Institute were maintained, would it not become a bottleneck that
artificially limits the number of people who pass the National Bar
Examination?
Therefore, details still remain undecided. Much will depend on the
legislative process that is expected to commence very soon.
